Sunday 19th May 2024
Keith Shayshutt has just published another book about buses in the south west.
This time he’s turned his forensic investigative powers to examine the turbulent 1978-1982 period when Western National, like all National Bus Company subsidiaries, went through the MAP (Market Analysis Project) era to establish a viable network of bus routes to which county councils could finance additional unprofitable routes.
Keith’s book is a very timely reminder what happens when you operate a bus network based on cross subsidy, ie using the profits of the ‘good’ routes to cross subsidise poorly used and unprofitable routes as happened for much of the 1970s.
It’s something those now constantly calling for “buses to be brought back under public control” always put forward as a main plank of their argument and I’m sure the new franchise loving Metro Mayors will have expectations of using assumed profits the “bus bandits of deregulation” have supposedly been enjoying all these years to instead fund unprofitable routes.
The host of LBC’s morning radio programme, James O’Brien, recently conducted a phone-in about Labour’s plan for buses which I couldn’t resist joining and, indeed, he put it to me profits from the good routes should be used to subsidise other routes as though it was an absolute given as you can hear from the clip below…
I tried my best to explain the flaw in this desired utopia which every bus company faced in the regulated 1970s as costs of operation rose, passenger numbers declined and county councils cut the grants and support paid for maintaining the network of routes. The many detailed tables in Keith’s book demonstrate this admirably.
By the time of MAP, Keith recalls the stark reality: Western National’s extensive network had “annual losses approaching £2 million (£11.5 million at today’s value)” and the company was heading for the financial abyss.
Across 14 chapters over 96 pages Keith reviews each of Western National’s 11 geographic areas in turn (stretching from Penzance to Bridgwater and Dorchester) setting out detailed route costings demonstrating how the number of profitable routes had declined to such an extent their financial contribution was dwarfed by the scale of the losses run up by the others.
The most profitable route, the 120 Newton Abbot-Torquay-Paignton-Brixham brought in an annual profit of £274,245 from its 14 buses followed by the 301 Ilfracombe-Barnstaple-Bideford-Westward Ho with a £112,622 surplus from 11 buses.
But Chapter 11 which looks at the North Devon network includes a table showing the 301 was the only profitable route in that area with losses amounting to £259,556 on the other 26 routes.
Without a never ending pot of subsidy gold from public funds something had to be done. And MAP was the answer.
Detailed surveys, route performance, passenger numbers and their origins and destinations were all fed into what in today’s terms was a rather primitive model which enabled analysts and network planners to identify a core network that could be run without subsidy.
Each area was dealt with in turn with new networks devised, together with routes added back thanks to county council subsidies, and all implemented between 1980 and 1982.
The book contains plenty of maps to remind the reader how extensive pre MAP networks had been as well as listings of route changes all illustrated by many wonderful photographs of buses on routes withdrawn and the many bus garages and bus stations which closed.
There’s a double page spread explaining what happened to the lovely route serving Mousehole as well as services to the Isle of Portland and details of the extensive network of contract buses serving the Winfrith Atomic Energy Establishment.
Keith also comments on developments in the express coach scene following the 1980 deregulation of that market and the rise of British Coachways and Trathens leading to the development of National Express’s Rapide brand,
In retrospect Keith observes while MAP undoubtedly addressed the economies Western National needed to make, “from the customer’s point of view, despite the hype of ‘new improved services’ there was little to shout about. In most cases post MAP the network coverage, span of operation and level of frequency was worse than before.”
But, of course, little more than a year later the whole process was up in the air again when, along with other NBC Subsidiaries, Western National was split into four smaller operating companies with “newly enthused and energetic management teams very quickly setting about improving their networks to the benefit of the customer.” As Keith observes “one aspect of this would be high frequency minibus operations in the key towns – Exeter being the first in 1983.”
Those smaller operating companies were subsequently privatised, and with deregulation introduced in October 1986, the formality was established of a profitable core network with county council funded additions duly tendered in the open market.
As I told James O’Brien this enabled many companies to develop their profitable network by using the profits to invest in improvements such as higher frequencies, new buses, attractive and persuasive marketing, community engagement and other strategies all with the objective of attracting more passengers.
If, instead, those profits are used to prop up loss making routes you don’t achieve the potential of increased passenger numbers. Instead, you get stagnation and decline. Furthermore, loss making routes generally don’t have growth potential so you find the network as a whole declines.
Exactly as happened for Western National which by the late 1970s, as Keith observes, needed that annual subsidy of £11.5 million at today’s prices.
Whilesoever Metro Mayors and BSIP favoured councils benefit from the Johnson legacy of significant financial support towards buses from various funding pots (especially in the conurbations) there’s no imperative to act, but once the next Government has to deal with the economic mess the country is in, the chickens are certain to be roosting back at home and I’d highly recommend today’s decision makers learn from history by giving Keith’s book a read.
It’s can be purchased on eBay, MDS Books or direct from Keith at keith.shayshutt1@gmail.com for £24 with £2.70 postage and packing. Buy it.
Roger French
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Comments on today’s blog are welcome but please keep them relevant to the blog topic, avoid personal insults and add your name (or an identifier). Thank you.
BusAndTrainUser 
Thanks for this review – I have not read the book (yet) but from what you say, there is a massive gap in its analysis, which is Integration. Beeching’s similar plan for the railway network failed because, as I believe the Railway invigoration Society (now part of railfuture) said at the time ‘cut off the branches and the (main) routes will die’. When, back in the 1920s, the railway companies started running buses, it was at least in one important part, to bring more custom to the main rail routes: if a passenger in Mousehole travelled to London, the bus fare to Helston was tiny, but the total extra income to the GWR from bus+train was huge., and well worth the ‘cross-subsidy’ to the bus operation. More importantly, from the passenger point of view the benefits were enormous.
Unfortunately, since Atlee, no Westminster government has seen the light on this (though the Metropolitan authorities have made efforts in their local areas). As regards the 1970s, when most bus and train services were nationalised, I remember listening to Brian Redhead on the BBC radio Today programme, interviewing Transport Minister William Rogers. Redhead asked “when are you going to make the buses and trains meet each other?”. Rogers replied that he had never said anything about integrating the services, and woffled on about something he called his ‘balanced transport policy’ – of which I can’t remember anything …
‘Cross-subsidy’ is a word which to me seems an lazy cop-out for not having a proper analysis of what really happens, or should happen, in a transport network. For example, evening (return) services, which don’t take much money in fares, are ‘cross-subsidised’ by the morning (out-bound) services which sell all the return tickets, but no one would think of stopping the evening buses … oh dear, they seem to have done just that, and are wondering why everyone is buying a car!
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What a great post! Never underestimate the importance of a network. On ‘profitable’ bus routes. I would wager that a bus company has a good idea about how much revenue is taken, but very little on where people come from when they use the service. Take the concessionary pass holder that might have changed buses to connect to the profitable route that takes them to a preferred shopping centre. Withdraw the feeder (tendered?) route and it’s unlikely that the profitable service would see that derived custom again. Then there’s the commuter market where a season ticket may well be purchased ‘off-bus’, so making apportionment of revenue-to-service even more difficult unless the operator embarks on a questionnaire at the time of application.
Back to MAP. The process was a realisation that existing networks cannot survive without the public subsidy which was unlikely to be forthcoming. With Franchising the debate is very similar with the added perception that with current ownership of bus companies, profits go abroad and are not invested locally. Is the inescapable conclusion here that no comprehensive bus network can exist without interference in the market?
Dan Tancock
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Good comment@
What we need is a combination of “newly enthused and energetic management teams very quickly setting about improving their networks to the benefit of the customer.” In the context of a publicly controlled network with long term funding (like the railway). This could be achieved through franchising or by establishing joint public/private operating companies. The objective should be an efficient network that contributes to local and national government policies relating to economic growth, health, education, employment, environment, cost of living. We really need to properly study other European countries and learn from them. I fear we may be going round in circles. Do the metro mayor’s realise that under franchising the responsibility for marketing and publicity falls to the transport authority, who should be “newly enthused and energetic” etc.
Peter Brown
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it seems to me that most non-urban buses have “had it” for the time being. We’re lucky where we are in Cheshire with an hourly service running until 2300hrs but loading seems sparse. How long can it last? On the other hand more and more Chelsea tractors are evident on our roads.
I’m just as bad. I travelled to north Manchester yesterday for a transport meeting by car. 1hr 10min travel time. By public transport it would have been three hours.
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The problem is in most areas the bus services are so bad they are all but unusable and the car is the only viable option. You are luck that you have bus services running in the evening. In most places they have finished by 7pm and if you want to travel on a Sunday forget it
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MAP began with Midland Red Ominous Company in Edgbaston in the mid 1970s. As MROC had effectively become like a POLO losing its most profitable services across Birmingham & The Black Country it needed to reshape its remaining network.
What did come from this was Express bus services from Birmingham to Hereford / Evesham & Malvern etc.
All this went on to benefit Midland Red West at D Day leading to it becoming a very successful company; being one of the first privitised; & the original joint creation of Badgerline Holdings.
In the end however MRW downfall fell to the get rich quick strategy of FirstGroup , the massive improvement of local rail in the West Midlands, massive increase in car ownership & a useless County Council.
However MAP played a very important bus role in buses in the Midlands & it role should never be underestimated.
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“MAP began with Midland Red Omnibus Company in Edgbaston in the mid 1970s”
Indeed it did, as the Viable Network Project which in my mind was a much more honest, if less PR-friendly, name for it. For all the Red’s die-hard supporters often prefer to deny it, by the late 70s MROC was in dire straits and I think effectively bankrupt – but then so were many other NBC companies; I don’t think Lincolnshire Road Car ever made a profit on its bus services, for example.
I’m sure the choice of Midland Red for the VNP was also helped along by the NBC Computer department also being based at Midland House thus allowing easy liaison between the Operators and the Computer Bods.
As someone who regularly used the Midland Express network (as it became) for days out at weekends, I do miss the Midland Red Limited Stop Services, but the truth is that even those routes which didn’t succumb to the reinvigorated British Rail in the early 1990s would today fail to compete with the car.
Those few interurban routes which do survive have become de-facto Limited Stop simply by dint of the lack of bus stops along main roads outside towns. Gone are the days of safely hailing the bus at a junction on a main A road! Unfortunately they are almost all operated by ordinary service buses now; Stagecoach East’s X5 has been downgraded from coaches to double-deck buses with exactly the same seats (and pitch) as their urban counterparts despite being painted yellow, and Wellglade’s Skylink buses are not hugely comfortable if you’re travelling for over an hour such as from Nottingham to Coalville or Leicester to East Midlands Airport.
A. Nony Mouse
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MAP was affectionately referred to as Market Annihilation Project by most platform staff when I was in the industry……
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Talking of ‘cross-subsidy’ of evening services on the same route as a profitable daytime service, I’ve heard the suggestion that even if an evening service carries very few people it may benefit the route as a whole as people have the confidence to use the daytime service without the risk of missing a last bus in the early evening, so are more likely to use the route rather than use an alternative mode.
Now turning back to overall loss-making routes I wonder if the same principle applies i.e. the ‘Network Benefit’ – giving overall confidence that the area has a comprehensive bus service. I suspect the effect is weaker, but not to be ignored.
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Bring Back Western Buses
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The cross-subsidised model is all fine up to a certain point, but such a network must contain a core of highly performing routes. The basic weakness of this model is that the fares on these routes have to be higher than they would be if they were not supporting the loss making ones. If there is a cycle of passenger numbers increasing, ability to finance new buses and support service improvements on the core, all is well, but if this is not happening, and the company gets into a situation where these routes are declining, the whole thing will eventually topple over as happened to most NBC companies in the 1970’s.
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As a teenager living in Taunton during the period covered by this book (and therefore reliant on the local buses to get about), the one aspect of MAP I remember was the virtual wiping out overnight of the Sunday services in and around Taunton, a scenario that I’m sure was mirrored elsewhere. Copy duly ordered….
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Almost one of the first acts of the Thatcher government was to de-regulate coach services, which was, and still remains an outstanding success. Even more so given the shambles the rail industry has managed to wedge itself into…..with coach passenger numbers still rising.
Many of us in the industry were more sceptical of bus de-regulation, but it gave companies freedom to develop services as outlined in the blog and Councils the power to subsidise socially necessary services which were not profitable. As the fledgling Stagecoach company under the Souter leadership rightly proclaimed, “Bringing the Bus out of the Dark Ages”. They, and many other brilliant people did just that.
But, it seems we are to wind the clock back to Politicians in charge, apparently now favoured by the majority. If the London situation is anything to go by, where “Contracts” are now the Holy Grail and the total inability to react swiftly to service changes, improvements or to a basic understanding of bus operation, then some may later regret.
Time will tell.
Terence Uden
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if “Genghis” Khan really succeeds in bringing London’s buses fully under public ownership and control as promised l wonder where he thinks he would garage 7000-odd vehicles? (Off-topic but a valid question.)
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“de-regulate coach services, which was, and still remains an outstanding success“
I have to disagree that coach services remain an outstanding success.
National Express are a shadow of their former selves (hidden to a certain extent by the difficulty of finding timetables, although at least NX do provide them in the depths of their website) and the other “big two”, Megabus and Flixbus, generally provide at best a few trips a day on primarily motorway routes competing with InterCity trains.
I wouldn’t want to go back to regulated coach services, mind!
A. Nony Mouse
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I remember MAP very well, NBC supplied us with an unreliable early desk top computer and as the youngest member of the team it was my job to fix it when it went wrong!
Keep up the good work explaining why more public involvement in the bus industry will not in itself improve bus services.
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MAP actually began as the Viable Network Project (VNP) as Midland Red began to realise their financial issues having lost their West Midlands powerbase.
However, the fundamental problems with cross-subsidy and the overall weakening of bus company finances were well known from the 1960s across the industry which was one reason why BET conditionally welcomed nationalisation. Falling passenger figures and a wealth of cross-subsidised basket cases were becoming an ever greater burden. This was evident in 1971 as Western National axed many services in North Cornwall and, as Roger will know, Southdown embarked on programme of depot closures and service cuts at the same time.
With the wealth of passenger data that is now available, operators are much better informed as to travel patterns. I do find it odd that some people seem to think that bus company managers don’t know of the potential benefits/pitfalls surrounding “shoulder journeys” i.e. those that operate early morning or evening and so contribute to the overall performance of the route and the profitable journeys in particular, even if they themselves are not. Of course they do, and many operators do indeed operate those journeys even if they are marginal at best. Most managers will take a view, backed up by data, in order to make an informed decision but there’s not much point sending out a vehicle carrying not much more than fresh air.
The bus industry had just about got itself sorted (there were, of course, exceptions) after the 1986 upheaval and consolidation of the 1990s. The problems since then have been politically driven – the introduction of ENCTS was a potential (and actual in some cases) benefit to operators but the impact to the Treasury was greater than envisaged. Moreover, the Tories (both in coalition and post 2015) used the economic circumstances to effect an ideological hollowing out of government spending and so the model of bus services was undermined.
Certainly, I feat what the new world of franchising in Manchester and elsewhere will achieve. Yes, they’ll be integration but I worry that the dead hand of centralised planning, and the cross-subsidy of propping up political expedient basket case schemes/routes will not address the fundamental issues affecting bus services. Painting a bus yellow won’t help it avoid congestion! Ted talk over 🙂
BW2
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As ever BW2 never actually bothers to read my posts as I clearly wrote “
MAP began with Midland Red Omibuus Company in Edgbaston in the mid 1970s. As MROC had effectively become like a POLO losing its most profitable services across Birmingham & The Black Country it needed to reshape its remaining network “
One day BW2 will actually read something correctly before actually commenting on it however to be honest I doubt that will ever happen!!!!!!!!
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The other side of the virtuous circle of improvement is how to get more bums on seats. ENCTS, the £2 fare are two examples of Government support that to one extent or another have helped the industry. The deeper question is what does it take to make people forsake their car and see public transport (whether bus or train) as a viable option.
For all the green-ness that everyone seems to espouse, many people appear to be physically attached to their precious bit of metal. I suspect that change will only come with a combination of stable timetables, better publicity (even internet-based stuff can be out of date and inaccurate), more bus lanes and better access to where people want to go (ie not moving bus termini to unloved corners of a town centre. Those suggestions are my own untested ideas, but I wonder if anyone has done any serious reseach into how people can be persuaded to change in a variety of settings – town & city, inter-urban and rural?
John Carr
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So true. Publicity is abysmal at times. Yesterday I bought a Discovery ticket. At £10, even with the £2 cap, it is still good value as easy to add up a lot of short trips pottering around on the South Coast. And, of course, you can just get off at a whim if somewhere looks nice – so no need to tell the driver where you are going. Finding a map of Discovery validity is almost impossible, and that matters, obviously, if near the edges of the ticket domain. And I came across drivers who were all very thoughtful but often said “Er, what’s this – never heard of it. Well, your ticket looks legit mate, so welcome on board”.
And why can’t Southern trains push the ticket? It will not detract passengers from their Coastway services. Quite the opposite. After a day, say, travelling west from Brighton and visiting lots of seaside places, it might be getting late. So a fast train back to Brighton (for then to London) would be a ticket sold on Coastway that would not have overwise have been purchased.
CH Oxford
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Southern used to sell a Downlander ticket that gave train and bus travel in much of Sussex. It was their decision to withdraw it, not the bus operators, probably more than 10 years ago.
Other regional multi-modal tickets also seem to have disappeared over the years – for example the one for the Isle of Wight and others covering parts of Wales – possibly leaving the Derbyshire Wayfarer tickets as one of the few examples outside the metropolitan areas.
Man of Kent
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‘As I told James O’Brien this enabled many companies to develop their profitable network by using the profits to invest in improvements such as higher frequencies, new buses, attractive and persuasive marketing, community engagement and other strategies all with the objective of attracting more passengers”
How many places has this actually happened though? There are a few examples of towns and cities where their has been indirect government subsidy e.g. bus priorities that may have improved provision but I think the vast majority of towns and cities across the UK over last ~40 years, this has not happened.
Also what is the approach of other countries in Europe and rest of world. If the UK deregulated approach was a real success other countries would have followed.
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“How many places has this actually happened though?“
A difficulty here is that Roger’s experience running a bus company is primarily in and around Brighton, a city which is very much an outlier in so many ways, from ever-supportive politicians to the multi-national students who are exploring a new country to the layout of the whole city area which encourages journeys, especially by bus.
The things which allowed Roger to be so successful in Brighton simply aren’t there elsewhere, and that means that his solutions unfortunately just aren’t viable in many other cities.
If only they were.
A. Nony Mouse
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Does money invested in improvements really count as profits though? The true “profits” are what is left over to be paid to shareholders, and that is presumably still a significant sum or shareholders wouldn’t invest. That’s the money that could be available for cross-subsidying, and wouldn’t affect efforts to attract more passengers.
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“As I Told James O’Brien”… I assume Mr French was memorising what happened at Brighton and Hove. lol
meanwhile
like all National Bus Company subsidiaries
didnt you review a LCBS book where it was done differently . at least in terms of network subsidy.
One set of comptometer operators spent all day adding up scheduled miles less lost miles to claim monthly fuel duty rebate.
Indeed MAP (which happened “locally” ) didnt always match some of the central planning analysis, but really central government leaped over the results of MAP before they were fully bedded in with the form of deregulation chosen and the choice of Exeter and other places as the experimental (which soon spread) minibus operations – certainly every academic study has found passengers do not like waiting time for buses ( certainly in urban areas with a good mix of traffic demand during peaks and accross the day (hospitals/shopping/ vfr / schools) So far as I can see no one has ever done an economic cost elasticity of supply for bus services – in theory keep running buses until the extra costs becomes more than the extra revenue (LT’s budget was always maximise passenger journeys for a total net cost cap).
John Hibbs of course probably the greatest writer of narrative of “The Problem of The Peak” and subisidy of unprofitable services – which he saw as an economic falsehood. , though the problem too idenfied you cannot really supply “half a bus” or even “half a road crew”. And as no doubt places like Taunton found for demand for buses , the more mileage you cut, the more passengers you lost, not only to the “loss making hours” but also the previously profitable services. I always reckoned it was managers on the ground who were best placed to make decisions, for local services improvements and variations. A lot of NBC work had been coal mine contracts and quite simply these dried up – In Wales, the North East, the Lancashire and Yorkshire coal fields areas, the contracts went and economic spending of households dropped, it was still cheaper for many families though to run an old car rather than hang about on cold nights with a walk from bus stop to home (and dont forget too say tyneside terraced housing destruction for new towns like Washington and dispersed home and workplace areas more difficult to serve by bus.
NBC’s costs were also allocated from Head Office costs/local costs/company costs as well as the more direct costs. There was a government borrowing target on (net? after depreciation, or gross –before) capital values with a requirment to earn between 5 and 9 percent on assets. – often other local bus companies using secondhand or cheaper to buy and run buses would be content with less as long as it covered financing and a decent wage for propritor. Despite some creative lease accounting ( which was stopped by a Cons government on tax changes – I was in the semi state owned milk marketing board by then but similar financial etc considerations had parrallels), NBC still didnt quite make that kind of return on all routes.
People have mentioned Manchester , which though the old municipal and company bus operations of the early 1970s (spares and staff issues aside) may be seen through some kind of rose coloured glasses, but they certainly had a kind of stability. What MAP often found though was the establishment of local identities was important (though most were too “forced” for my liking) , and that perhaps the early NBC corporate build attempt wasnt needed at the public facing level , and likewise were were the real economies of scale in merging so many of the companies – for Western National Devon General bringing in Exeter Corporation and the Bristol Company depot swaps probably did make sense.
It was of course cross – subsidy and “wasteful competiton” that was the bedrock of the regulated service era, and as pointed out Midland Red lost both its network effect with WMPTE takeovers, and its higher revenue routes to actual make the regulated road service idea in its area redundant. But for Western National it seemed to be unwilling to attempt to increase its operations – in part other companies had both the school contracts and a lot of market day services such that North Devon area to anywhere south other than Exeter didnt happen – and the likes of Bude depot had already been sold to Jennings before MAP got going – leaving the LSWR witherd arm bus replacements not part of an integrated network, despite Devon County Council’s excellent timetable books.
JBC Prestatyn
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In my view deregulation has failed and continues to fail and services continue to decline
BSIP has allowed a few areas to improve service but for how long who knows. The £2 far has probably slowed down the decline in services but that’s all
Without real improvements to bus services with more routes better frequencies and longer operating hours nothing will change. The tinkering around on the fringes will change nothing
The first problem is thinking that buses can be operated totally commercially. Interestingly in many cases carsa are more subsidised than buses
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I’m sorry bus I cannot agree with A Noney Mouse. There is potential for buses in virtually every urban area and many more rural ones. What Roger achieved was getting the local authority on side by willing to invest and improve so that the bus network became ever more attractive and thus gained ever more passengers. You do need an authority that is positively not anti bus, but even agnostic ones can be won over if by nothing else by getting less complaints about buses. In Milton Keynes MK Metro managed to double passengers from a very low base over 7 years by getting partners on board, not only the local authority but the owners of the shopping centre once they realised what proportion of their footfall came on the bus. It took 4/5 years before passengers really began to trust that buses were improving. The main route managed a 40% passenger increase over an 18 month period.
Can you imagine that Bourne, Lincolnshire is wonderful bus territory? It isn’t but because Delaine have operated a consistently high standard of service over very many years it has become an area of above average bus use. The key point is consistency over several years, which is why the current BSIP process is doomed to failure unless the improvements can be maintained over several years.
Julian Peddle
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Agree Julian. With the current opportunties of private bus companies in their market places i.e low modal shares, it is time they step up to the plate with innovation and show what the free markets can offer. A postivie input in terms of ridership & econonic benefits they can add to the communities they serve.
I suspect due to many big groups being too big to fail (e.g. the Government couldn’t never let Stagecoach go bankrupt & even bailed them out during Covid) and in providing what in essence is a public service, many bus companies don’t show what commercial flair and enterprise they have. Instead they are wanting the public interventions from direct abd indirect funding, without any strings attached. I.e. they needed to be weined off money for nothing
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I’ve never been to Bourne so thought I’d try out impressive Delaine confidently knowing the fare would be £2 not having to worry about the specific destination.
£2 please….no we don’t do that, oh I’ll have a day ticket then, only to sit down and find I’d got a day ticket between Peterborough and Bourne only.
I’m loathe to give constructive feedback because they (whoever they are) will probably blame the driver!
Yesterday I arrived in Newcastle confident in the knowledge there is a £6.80 day ticket for all buses, Metro and ferry in Tyne and Wear, Northumbria and Durham.
I purchased one from the Metro hidden in a sub menu. Had great time will buy another one today. Go Ahead even advertise it on exterior fares panel as you board the bus.
For me leisure travelling by bus is like listening to music on Youtube. You try something once and then come back again and again, although I took it to another level with Brighton much to financial benefit of their buses and local economy over many years.
Bourne, I won’t be back.
I’ve just spent the whole of £2 journey to Whitby looking at my phone typing this after losing what I’d written when taking photo. I can see why a chap on my 701 the other day said he doesn’t type while on his travels.
Whitby, I’ll be back
John Nicholas
P.S. Arriva has brilliant buses, I always wonder why the staff so miserable!
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As far as I know, the £2 maximum fare was never compulsory ( in the way that acceptance of the various concessionary travel passes is ) so that it is always advisable to check whether it is offered, or not. While £2 is perhaps reasonable for a journey from a suburban terminus to the local town or city centre, for longer interurban or rural journeys it is probably significantly below the usual fares. As such, it does not seem unreasonable to expect potential users to check whether it is available for the chosen journey.
In deference to greenline727, who commented about fare payment methods on an earlier blog post ( https://busandtrainuser.com/2024/05/16/stagecoach-begins-competing-with-brighton-hove/ ), this does illustrate why it is important that operators provide potential passengers with information about fare payment methods and options. In this respect, Delaine cannot be faulted – the information is on their website, under the logical heading “Tickets” – https://www.delainebuses.com/tickets.html. Here it can be seen that the “Day rover” ticket is £5.80, and information about where it can be used is also provided there.
RC169
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Topical article for this thread on public ownership of bus services, featuring Reading Buses and quotes from its CEO:
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/clke3g03rljo
Peter Brown
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The best way to describe the current services is one of managed decline. Clearly there are a few exception but overall it is decline
Without public subsidy in my view that situation will not change
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Maybe there are lessons to be learned from this example. Why run expensive to operate routes to the city centre fighting through congestion, and only serving those wanting to go into the centre? Why not operate high frequency short routes connecting suburbs to the nearest rail corridor instead.
Peter Brown
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At present rail and bus are pretty much seen as two totally separate and competing systems and are not integrated
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